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Friday, March 23, 2007

"Non-traditional" -- is that like innovative?


(photo: USSOUTHCOM)

The Center for International Policy's Adam Isacson, back from a two-day conference at Southern Command, describes in today's Plan Colombia and Beyond post bravely standing before a room full of Latin American military brass, and telling them that Costa Rica, which renounced its standing army in 1948, has got it right.

He deserves some kind of NGO Purple Heart -- the Purple Barbed-wire-wrapped Candle?

As usual, a thoughtful presentation of a serious, and overlooked, problem in South America: cash-strapped governments sending their militaries out to do traditionally civilian duties, anything from heavy-gunned police and anti-narcotics work to environmental protection in understaffed parks to Chavez's outright use of military for "teaching in schools, building housing, and running neighborhood food kitchens ."

The lines too easily blur, Isacson says, when the military, whose exceptional and definitive task is the obliteration of an enemy, takes over the role of civilian police.

A number of realities are at play:

-- the threat of foreign aggression has all but disappeared, making armies irrelevant, as Costa Rica eloquently demonstrates,
-- internal insecurity and civil disorder make police, on the other hand, supremely relevant,
-- the civil societies in question (for a variety of reasons) are not meeting other civil needs (besides security) through civil government,
-- the easy and short-sighted solution is to fuse all of these, dumping civil jobs on a military that can't say no, and police jobs on a military that doesn't have to answer to civil judges.

Sound like a familiar Latin American two-step toward military rule? Isacson concludes:

The Costa Rican delegation to the conference was clearly proud of, and satisfied with, the choice their country had made back in 1948. As governments throughout the region become ever more worried about internal crime, and defense from foreign aggression becomes ever less a compelling mission, the Costa Rican model seems to make more and more sense. Why not focus all security resources on improving the police - the institution designed to deal with the crime threat that worries citizens the most?

Needless to say, none of the other militaries present, much less Southern Command, voiced enthusiasm for the Costa Rican model. As far as possible alternatives go, it's still a bit too “non-traditional.”